Methodology · Infrastructure and AD pentesting · Red teaming
Active Directory config review
Defensive Active Directory review checklist for audits: privileged accounts, krbtgt, delegation, LAPS, legacy protocols, GPOs, ADCS and logging.
Published
AI prompt · Red teaming
Prompt that prepares a purple team debrief from the Red Team timeline and SOC alerts: detections, gaps, quick wins and ATT&CK techniques to verify.
Works with: Claude, other chat assistants
You are a detection analyst running a purple team debrief between the Red Team and the SOC. Prepare the debrief material from the two sources below.
Exercise context: {{context}}
Red Team timeline (actions carried out, timestamped): {{red_team_timeline}}
Alerts and events seen by the SOC: {{soc_alerts}}
Available log sources: {{log_sources}}
Produce:
1. a table, one row per step of the timeline, with: timestamp, action carried out, candidate ATT&CK technique (name and identifier), status (detected, partially detected, not detected, undetermined), matching alert or event if any, delay between the action and the alert;
2. the list of detection gaps, each with the log source that could have covered it and the information missing to conclude;
3. quick wins: improvements achievable within a few days (rule to tune, logging to enable, threshold to review), ranked by estimated effort and expected benefit;
4. longer-term improvements, to be planned;
5. questions to ask the SOC during the debrief.
Rules:
- correlate only on what the timestamp and the event content show; if the link between an action and an alert is uncertain, classify the step as "undetermined" and say what would settle it;
- do not invent ATT&CK identifiers: if you are not sure of an identifier, write it in square brackets with the words "to be verified";
- a missing alert may come from missing logging as much as from a missing rule: distinguish the two hypotheses;
- stay factual and non-accusatory: the aim is to improve detection, not to judge the team.
Replace the highlighted variables before use.
This prompt prepares the debrief session of a Red Team exercise run in purple team mode: for each step carried out, did the SOC see it, if not why, and what can be fixed quickly. It structures the discussion without replacing the teams’ own log analysis.
| Variable | Example |
|---|---|
{{context}} |
authorised three-week Red Team exercise on the corp.example.org domain, SOC informed at the end of the exercise |
{{red_team_timeline}} |
D3 09:12 simulated attachment opened on a pilot workstation; D3 11:05 LDAP query of the administration groups; D5 14:30 access to a file share with a service account |
{{soc_alerts}} |
D3 09:15 antivirus alert on the pilot workstation (medium severity); D5 14:50 "unusual sign-in" alert on the service account |
{{log_sources}} |
domain authentication logs, EDR on workstations, file server logs, no detailed directory service logs |
Provide timestamps in the same time zone and format for both sources. To map actions to techniques, use the MITRE ATT&CK mapping prompt; for how to organise the exercise, see preparing a Red Team exercise.
Methodology · Infrastructure and AD pentesting · Red teaming
Defensive Active Directory review checklist for audits: privileged accounts, krbtgt, delegation, LAPS, legacy protocols, GPOs, ADCS and logging.
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BEAROPS
BEAROPS runs red team exercises lasting one to six months, built on MITRE ATT&CK, to put your detection and response to the test.