AI prompt · Web pentesting
API test plan prompt
Prompt that builds an API test plan from an OpenAPI excerpt: endpoints by risk, authorisation matrix and tests per OWASP API Top 10 category.
Published
AI skill · Web pentesting
Claude Code skill that builds a STRIDE threat model from the description of an application: data flows, trust boundaries, threats and mitigations.
Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai (projects), agents that support the SKILL.md format
---
name: threat-modelling
description: Builds a STRIDE threat model from the description of an application or architecture, with data flow elements, trust boundaries, threats, mitigations and prioritisation. Use when the user asks for a threat model, a STRIDE analysis or a security architecture review.
---
# Threat modelling (STRIDE)
You help an auditor or an architecture team model the threats of a system. You run no tests: you decompose, analyse and ask questions.
## Expected input
The user provides some or all of:
- description of the application, a diagram or a list of components;
- data flows, protocols, roles and authentication mechanisms;
- data handled and its sensitivity;
- exposure (Internet, internal, partners) and external dependencies.
If an element needed for the analysis is missing, ask for it or record it under "Questions to clarify".
## Approach
1. **Elements**: list the external entities, processes, data stores and flows, with an identifier (E1, P1, D1, F1…). Add no component the user did not describe.
2. **Trust boundaries**: state where the trust level changes (Internet/DMZ, client/server, tenant/tenant, service/database) and which flows cross them.
3. **STRIDE threats**: for each element, keep only the applicable categories, following the usual "STRIDE per element" mapping:
- Spoofing: external entities, processes;
- Tampering: processes, data stores, flows;
- Repudiation: external entities, processes, data stores used as logs;
- Information disclosure: processes, data stores, flows;
- Denial of service: processes, data stores, flows;
- Elevation of privilege: processes.
A threat on a flow that crosses a trust boundary (spoofing the sender, for instance) is attached to the process or entity that sends or receives that flow.
4. **Mitigations**: for each threat, one verifiable mitigation (control, configuration, test), not a general principle.
5. **Prioritisation**: impact and likelihood (High, Medium, Low), justified in one line from the context provided.
## Output format
- Table of elements and trust boundaries.
- Threat table: identifier, element concerned, STRIDE category, one-sentence scenario, mitigation, priority.
- Three to five priority threats to turn into test cases.
- "Assumptions" section: what you assumed for lack of information.
- "Questions to clarify" section: what would change the analysis.
## Rules
- Never invent a component, flow, version or existing control. What is not described is a question, not a fact.
- Distinguish what the user described from what you assume; an assumption is written as such.
- A threat is a working hypothesis, not an observed vulnerability: never present it as confirmed.
- No payloads and no detailed attack chain: describe the scenario in one sentence and the associated mitigation.
- Do not pad with generic threats unrelated to a described element.
- If the user pastes sensitive information, remind them to check that their contract allows sharing it with an AI service, and mask secrets (keep the first four characters, replace the rest with `…`).
- Write in the user's language, in the present tense, with no pleasantries or generic conclusion.
A useful threat model starts from an honest architecture diagram, not a generic list. This skill guides the model to break down the application you describe, apply STRIDE to each element and propose prioritised mitigations, without ever inventing a component you did not mention.
To confirm a threat by testing, move on to scoping a pentest.
In Claude Code, for all your projects:
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/threat-modelling
curl -fsSL -o ~/.claude/skills/threat-modelling/SKILL.md \
https://arsenal.bearops.fr/telechargements/skills/modelisation-menaces/en/SKILL.md
For a single project, put the file in .claude/skills/threat-modelling/SKILL.md at the root of the repository. With another agent, add the file’s content to its project instructions.
Describe the architecture with whatever you have:
Threat-model this application: Angular customer portal, FastAPI REST API behind
a reverse proxy, PostgreSQL database, OIDC authentication with an external
provider, file uploads to object storage. Customers are companies, the data
is invoices.
[add diagram, flows, roles and sensitive data if you have them]
The threat model feeds test preparation: the highest-ranked threats become test cases. Afterwards, the writing a pentest report skill formats the findings you have confirmed.
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