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Red Team rules of engagement template

Red Team rules of engagement template: parties, scenarios, scope, forbidden actions, white team, escalation, stop criteria, data and signatures.

By Steven Carrier Published

red-team-rules-of-engagement-template.md

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# Rules of engagement: Red Team exercise [exercise name]

> **To be reviewed by each party's legal counsel.** This template is a drafting starting point: it is neither legal advice nor a contract. The legal framework, authorisations from third parties (hosting providers, suppliers, subsidiaries), personal data protection and employment law depend on each situation and must be validated by the legal counsel of both the client and the provider before any activity begins.

| | |
|---|---|
| Reference | [Exercise reference] |
| Document version | [1.0] |
| Date | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Classification | Confidential, distribution limited to the list in section 10 |

## 1. Parties

| Role | Organisation | Legal representative | Operational contact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Client (sponsor) | [Organisation] | [Name, role] | [Name, phone, email] |
| Provider (Red Team) | [Company] | [Name, role] | [Name, phone, email] |
| Third parties involved | [Hosting provider, supplier, subsidiary] | [Name] | [Contact] |

The client declares that it is entitled to authorise the activities described on all the assets in section 4. For any asset owned or hosted by a third party, the third party's written authorisation is attached: [yes / no, reference].

## 2. Objectives

- Main objective: [for example, assess the organisation's ability to detect and respond to a determined attacker]
- Secondary objectives: [measure time to detect, test the escalation process, assess staff awareness]
- Out of scope objectives: [for example, assess the completeness of vulnerabilities, which is the job of a penetration test]

## 3. Scenarios

| No. | Scenario | Starting point | Goal to reach ("trophy") | Reference techniques |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [Title] | [External access / supplied internal workstation / user account] | [Access to [dummy or agreed data or system]] | [MITRE ATT&CK reference] |
| 2 | [Title] | [Starting point] | [Goal] | [Reference] |

"Trophies" are items agreed in advance (marker file, dummy record, proof of access). No real sensitive data is exfiltrated to demonstrate access: [proof by screenshot or marker file].

## 4. Scope and exclusions

### 4.1 In scope

| Asset | Description | Owner | Environment |
|---|---|---|---|
| [IP ranges, domains, applications, sites, targetable people] | [Description] | [Owner] | [Production / Staging] |

### 4.2 Out of scope

- [Excluded assets: critical systems, medical devices, industrial systems, third parties without authorisation]
- [Excluded people: for example executives, staff representatives, people in vulnerable situations]
- [Excluded techniques: for example denial of service, physical access to [site]]

## 5. Authorised and forbidden actions

### 5.1 Authorised actions

- [Reconnaissance from open sources]
- [Social engineering tests through [channels] on [population] up to [volume]]
- [Exploitation of vulnerabilities on the assets in section 4.1 within the scenarios in section 3]
- [Lateral movement and privilege escalation within the scope]
- [Physical access to [sites], during [time windows], with an authorisation letter to show if challenged]

### 5.2 Forbidden actions

- Any action likely to interrupt a production service, unless prior written agreement is given.
- Any access to, copy or exfiltration of real sensitive data beyond the minimum agreed proof.
- Any action outside the agreed assets, dates and hours.
- Any modification or deletion of client data, other than items created by the team and recorded in an inventory.
- Any threat to the safety of people, and any pressure or threat towards staff.
- Any attack on third parties not named in section 1.
- [Other prohibitions specific to the exercise]

### 5.3 Precautions

- Tools and accesses created by the team are recorded in a log and removed at the end of the exercise.
- Actions are timestamped with their source IP addresses: [addresses or ranges].
- If there is doubt about the lawfulness or risk of an action, the team stops and consults the white team.

## 6. White team and deconfliction

The white team knows about the exercise and acts as arbiter. The detection and response teams (blue team) are not informed: [only the people listed below are].

| Role | Name | Phone | Email | Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| White team lead (client) | [Name] | [Number] | [Address] | [24/7 during the exercise / time windows] |
| White team deputy | [Name] | [Number] | [Address] | [Time windows] |
| Red Team lead | [Name] | [Number] | [Address] | [24/7 during the exercise] |
| Legal contact | [Name] | [Number] | [Address] | [Time windows] |

**Deconfliction.** When the blue team opens an incident, the white team checks with the Red Team whether it is exercise activity, without revealing the exercise to the rest of the organisation.

- Confirmation channel: [call to the number in section 6, code word]
- Red Team response time: [30 minutes]
- If the activity is not from the exercise, the white team treats the event as a real incident, and the Red Team suspends its actions until further notice.

## 7. Communication and escalation

| Situation | Action | Timeframe | Contact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Routine status update | [Written report] | [Daily / weekly] | [White team] |
| Critical vulnerability found | Immediate notification, without waiting for the end of the exercise | [4 hours] | [White team] |
| Unexpected impact on a service | Stop the action, call the white team | Immediate | [White team] |
| Real sensitive data encountered | Stop collection, notify, secure the data | Immediate | [White team, legal contact] |
| Earlier real compromise detected | Suspend, switch to incident response | Immediate | [White team, CISO] |

Exchanges take place on an agreed encrypted channel: [encrypted messaging, address]. Exercise information does not travel through any other channel.

## 8. Stop criteria

The exercise is suspended or stopped, by the white team or the Red Team, in the following cases:

- a real or imminent impact on production, people's safety or the continuity of a critical activity;
- discovery of a real compromise by a third party;
- discovery of data that the team is not authorised to hold;
- going outside the authorised scope or hours;
- all objectives reached, or the schedule expires;
- a written request from the client or its legal representative;
- [other criteria].

## 9. Data handling

| Topic | Rule |
|---|---|
| Data collected | [Minimum needed as proof, with no copy of real sensitive data] |
| Storage | [Encrypted workstation, engagement-dedicated space, named access] |
| Transmission | [Encrypted channel only] |
| Personal data | [Processing compliant with GDPR, legal basis, individuals anonymised in the report] |
| Retention period | [Duration, for example 6 months after report delivery] |
| Destruction | [Secure erasure, destruction certificate given to the client] |
| Credentials recovered | [Reset requested at the end of the exercise] |

## 10. Schedule and deliverables

| Step | Date or period |
|---|---|
| Signature of the rules of engagement | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Exercise start | [YYYY-MM-DD] at [hh:mm] |
| Exercise end | [YYYY-MM-DD] at [hh:mm] |
| Authorised time windows | [Days and hours] |
| Debrief to the white team | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Final report | [YYYY-MM-DD] |
| Removal of access and clean-up | [YYYY-MM-DD] |

Deliverables: [final report, detailed timeline of actions, detection and response recommendations, debrief workshop with the blue team].

Distribution list for this document: [names or roles].

## 11. Signatures

The parties acknowledge that they have read these rules of engagement, had them reviewed by their legal counsel, and accept them.

| Party | Name and role | Date | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|
| Client | [Name, role] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | |
| Provider | [Name, role] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | |
| Third party involved | [Name, role] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | |
| Client legal counsel (initials) | [Name] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | |
| Provider legal counsel (initials) | [Name] | [YYYY-MM-DD] | |

A Red Team exercise extends the penetration test: it imitates a determined adversary over time, testing detection and response as much as prevention. The more realistic the actions, the more precise the framework must be. The rules of engagement set out what is allowed, what is not, who can stop the exercise and how.

To be reviewed by each party’s legal counsel. This template is a drafting starting point, not legal advice or a contract. Third-party authorisations, personal data, employment law, physical access: each point depends on the situation and must be validated by the legal counsel of both the client and the provider before any activity begins.

What the template contains

  • Parties: client, provider, third parties involved, representatives and contacts.
  • Objectives and scenarios: objectives, starting points, agreed "trophies", reference techniques.
  • Scope and exclusions: assets, people and techniques included or excluded.
  • Authorised and forbidden actions: including execution precautions.
  • White team and deconfliction: contacts reachable at all times, procedure to confirm an activity.
  • Communication and escalation: situations, timeframes, contacts, encrypted channel.
  • Stop criteria: what suspends or ends the exercise.
  • Data handling: minimal collection, storage, retention, destruction.
  • Schedule, deliverables and signatures: dates, time windows, legal counsel initials.

Writing tips

  • Choose dummy or pre-agreed "trophies": proving access does not justify exfiltrating real data.
  • Name at least two white team members reachable throughout, day and night if the exercise runs outside office hours.
  • Check that every asset, especially at a hosting provider or supplier, is covered by its owner’s written authorisation.
  • Plan for exercise activity being mistaken for a real incident: that is what the deconfliction procedure is for.
  • Carry the authorisation letter on you for any physical action.
  • The rules of engagement complement scoping: see the penetration test scoping checklist and, for the debrief, the penetration test report template.

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